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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DELL D. ARCHULETA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900375-CA 
Priority No, 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-11-104(6) (Supp. 1990) 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-208 (1980) 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-209 (1980) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court err in determining that Dell Archuleta 
had failed to comply with the terms of his probation? 
1. Did Dell Archuleta willfully fail to maintain 
employment? 
2. Did Dell Archuleta willfully fail to submit a 
monthly report for the month of May, 1990? 
3. Did Dell Archuleta willfully fail to pay the 
court ordered fine and child support payments? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Before revoking probation, the State must prove "a 
violation of a condition of probation [by] a preponderance of the 
evidence." State v. Hodges, 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 45 (Utah App. 
1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On October 6, 1989, a jury convicted Dell D. Archuleta of 
Theft, a second degree felony, and Theft by Deception, a class B 
misdemeanor. (R 25, 26). The Honorable Pat Brian suspended his 
sentence, a prison term, and instead imposed an eighteen month 
period of probation with accompanying conditions. 
On May 18, 1990, Karl Bartell of Adult Parole and Probation 
[AP&P], filed an "Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause" with 
the trial court, alleging various probation violations. (R 80-81) . 
On June 20, 1990, following the Order to Show Cause hearing, the 
- 2 -
court found that Dell Archuleta had violated his probation as 
alleged in four allegations of AP&P7s affidavit. (R 95-96). The 
court then reinstated another probationary term and added some more 
conditions. (R 96). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 6, 1989, a jury convicted Dell D. Archuleta of 
Theft, a second degree felony, and Theft by Deception, a class B 
misdemeanor. (R 25, 26). The Honorable Pat Brian sentenced 
Mr. Archuleta to a prison term of one to fifteen years and a fine of 
$10,000. (R 73-75). Both penalties were then stayed and the court 
instead imposed an eighteen month period of probation which included 
the following conditions. 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of 
Adult Probation & Parole. 
Pay a fine in the amount of $1000 . . . or at the rate 
of [$]100.00 month starting January 1, 1990. 
Pay restitution in the amount of $77.00 . . . at a 
rate of in full by 6-1-90 
Obtain and maintain full-time employment. 40 hours a 
week. 
[Defendant] must obtain employment by Oct 16, 1989. 
[Defendant] must pay child support as ordered starting 
Nov 1, 1989. $75.00 per month. 
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All child support arrearages must be paid in 18 months 
at a rate of $225.00 per month. Total payment $300.00 
per month. 1/2 at 1st month - 1/2 half on 15th month. 
(R 73-74) (Addendum B). 
After Dell Archuleta was placed on probation, he signed a 
probation agreement dated October 19, 1989. Transcript of Order to 
Show Cause Hearing (June 20, 1990) (hereinafter referred to as "T") 
at 26. Kevin Nitzel of Adult Parole and Probation initially 
supervised Archuleta and explained the agreement to him. (T 4, 
34). One of the conditions of probation required Archuleta to 
submit a monthly report.1 (R 78). Archuleta complied with this 
requirement while he was supervised by Nitzel, from the start of his 
probation until January, 1990. (T 10-11, 13). Frequently, however, 
Kevin Nitzel reminded Archuleta that he was late in filling out the 
monthly report. (T 20, 23). Archuleta would respond immediately, 
completing the report the same day as he was called or shortly 
thereafter. (T 20). 
In February, 1990, another probation officer, Harvey Van 
Katwyk, began supervising Dell Archuleta. (T 9). When Archuleta 
did not complete a monthly report, Van Katwyk reminded him of his 
obligation. (T 13-14). Archuleta responded immediately to his 
request. (T 14, 20). 
1
 The "monthly report," though referred to and admitted as 
Exhibit 1 during the Order to Show Cause Hearing (T. 7), cannot be 
found within the record. The actual probation agreement signed by 
Dell Archuleta was never made part of the record. 
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In addition to the monthly report, Archuleta was required 
to "maintain verifiable, lawful employment and/or education" and to 
make court ordered fines and payments. (R 78, 81). Dell Archuleta 
obtained full time employment at the Red Lion Hotel from "around 
Thanksgiving [1989]" until "around February [1990.]" (T 14-15). He 
received "$3.50 an hour" plus "gratuity pay" of "about $20 extra" 
each paycheck. (T 14, 15). Archuleta eventually left his job after 
being accused of stealing somebody's eyeglasses. (T 15). 
Archuleta also obtained temporary and part time 
employment. (T 18). His job search included applications filed at 
Mulboon's; Village Inn; Coachman's; Doubletree; Marriott's; Coyote 
Bill's; and Su Casa. (T 16). Through his frequent visits to Job 
Service, Archuleta often received temporary employment. (T 18). 
His income, however, could not cover his living expenses. 
His expenses included the rent; a hospital bill; his phone 
bill; the electricity; gas; and food. (T 18, 19). He also paid his 
ex-wife, Mercy, to see his four year old daughter, Veronica. (T 19, 
42). Because of his financial situation, Archuleta arranged a 
partial payment schedule with the collecting agencies. (T 21, 24). 
Yet Archuleta still did not have enough money to consistently pay 
his entire rent. (T 21). At best, he had $5 or $10 extra when he 
was fully employed at the Red Lion. (T 24). But his "spare" income 
would never be enough to cover such necessary expenses as a dental 
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bill. (T 17). Though ill and debilitated from the effects of an 
abscessed tooth, Archuleta could not afford dental treatment. He 
"pulled the tooth out" himself. (T 17). 
Archuleta was ill "through March, after April," at about 
the same time probation officer Karl Bartell was assigned to his 
case. (T 17). Having never met Archuleta, Bartell attempted to 
contact him on or about April 3, 1990. (T 10, 21). Bartell was 
unable to reach Archuleta and left a message at his residence. 
Archuleta returned Bartell's phone call and the two met the next 
day. (T 6, 9). Bartell and Archuleta discussed the probation 
agreement in a manner similar to prior discussions between other 
probation officers and Archuleta. For example, once an officer was 
assigned to supervise Archuleta, he contacted Archuleta for "a 
discussion on his probation, what he was supposed to do, [and] how 
he was supposed to conduct himself on probation." Compare (T 6-7) 
with (T 33-34). When Archuleta forgot to fill out the April monthly 
report, Karl Bartell, like the other probation officers who had 
supervised Archuleta, reminded Dell of his monthly obligation. 
(T 20, 23). As in the past, Archuleta quickly complied with the 
officer's request. (T 23). For the month of May, however, 
Archuleta did not complete a monthly report, nor was he reminded of 
this obligation. (T 23). 
On May 18, 1990, Karl Bartell filed a "Progress/Violation 
Report" and an "Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause" with 
the court, alleging various probation violations. (R 78-81). The 
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affidavit alleged that Archuleta did not submit his monthly report 
for the month of May; that he established another residence without 
notifying AP&P; that he did not maintain employment or education; 
and that he failed to pay the fine or the child support payments. 
(R 80-81) (Addendum C). 
On June 20, 1990, the State and Mr. Archuleta both appeared 
before the Honorable Pat Brian to set forth their respective 
positions. (R 112); (T 3-49). The court found that Dell Archuleta 
had violated his probation by failing to submit a monthly report for 
the month of May, 1990; by failing to maintain lawful employment 
and/or education; by failing to pay $100 per month towards his fine; 
and by failing to pay $300 per month towards the child support 
obligation. (R 95-96) (Addendum D). The court did not find that 
Archuleta had unlawfully changed his residence. (T 31). 
The court then revoked Archuleta's probation and reinstated 
another eighteen month period of probation with the following 
conditions: 
1. That all conditions of probation previously 
imposed be in effect. 
2. That he serve six months in jail with credit for 
time served. 
3. That within fifteen calendar days from his release 
from jail, he be employed sixty hours per week, and 
that he provide written verification of the same. 
4. That he be enrolled in vocational training as soon 
as possible after his release from jail, but no later 
than ninety days from that release . . . . 
(R 91, 96) (Addendum D). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court should not have revoked Dell Archuleta's 
probation as his noncompliance with the terms of probation was not 
willful. AP&P's repeated acceptance of, and acquiescence to, the 
monthly reports filed belatedly by Archuleta constituted a waiver of 
its right to require strict compliance of the probation agreement. 
The conduct of the respective parties was also relevant to determine 
the meaning of the terms of the agreement. 
Dell Archuleta did maintain lawful employment during the 
period of his probation through full-time, part-time, and temporary 
employment. The unskilled positions, however, did not pay him 
enough money to cover his necessary living expenses and all of the 
court ordered payments. Nevertheless Dell did pay his ex-wife child 
support payments, in amounts proportionate to his ability to pay, 
though he was unable to pay the entire amounts due. But a court 
cannot revoke probation for the nonpayment of court ordered amounts 
if, as here, the probationer's noncompliance was not willful. Dell 
Archuleta made good faith efforts to abide by the conditions of his 
probation. The court erred in its determination. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
APPELLANT'S PROBATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REVOKED 
BECAUSE HIS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF 
PROBATION WAS NOT WILLFUL. 
"[I]n order to revoke probation, a violation of a probation 
condition must, as a general rule, be willful." State v. Hodges, 
142 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 43 (Utah App. 1990); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 
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U.S. 660 (1983). "An act or omission is 'willfully' done if [there 
is a] specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be 
done; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to 
disregard the law." Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (5th ed. 1979). 
"The word [willfully] . . . when used in a criminal context . . . 
means an act done with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse; 
stubbornly, obstinately, perversely." Id. As explained below, Dell 
Archuleta did not willfully violate his probation. 
On May 18, 1990, Dell Archuleta's probation officer, Karl 
Bartell, filed an "Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause" with 
the court which alleged the following violations: 
1. The defendant [Dell Archuleta] has . . . not 
submitted his monthly reports for May by the 5th of 
the month as agreed to by the defendant; 
2. The defendant has . . . changed or established 
another residence without notifying or knowledge of 
his probation agent. . . . 
3. The defendant has failed to maintain verifiable, 
lawful employment and/or education; 
4. The defendant has . . . failed to pay the minimum 
amount set by the Court of $100.00 per month towards 
his fine as required by the Court; and 
5. The defendant has . . . failed to make any child 
support payments, and any payments towards the child 
support arrears; which was to be at a rate of $225.00 
per month with total payments being $300.00 per month. 
(R 80-81) (Addendum C). Following arguments posed by the respective 
parties during the order to show cause hearing, the court found Dell 
Archuleta in violation of four of the five allegations. (R 95-96). 
The court did not find that Archuleta had unlawfully changed his 
residence. (T 31). 
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A. ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE WAIVED ITS RIGHT 
TO REQUIRE APPELLANT'S STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE PROBATION AGREEMENT. 
The first violation found by the court, noncompliance with 
the monthly report requirement for the month of May, 1990, should 
not have been deemed a violation which supported the revocation of 
probation. Rather, AP&P's repeated acceptance of the monthly 
reports filed belatedly by Dell Archuleta evidenced AP&P's 
willingness to forego a strict interpretation of the probation 
agreement. Indeed, the conduct of the respective parties was 
relevant to determine whether AP&P waived or modified the terms of 
the agreement. 
"[A] probation agreement . . . is essentially a contract 
with the court; the court agrees to stay part or all of the 
statutory sentence, and the probationer in turn agrees to perform or 
abstain from performing certain acts." State v. Hodges, 142 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 39, 45 (Utah App. 1990). AP&P also plays a vital role in 
the contract; it acts as an extension of the court in monitoring the 
performance of the probationer and makes its own conditions of 
probation. 
The performance agreed upon between Dell Archuleta and AP&P 
required Dell to submit a monthly report by the 5th of each month2 
2
 AP&P's "Progress/Violation Report" alleged that Dell 
Archuleta did "not [submit] his monthly report for May by the 5th of 
the month as agreed to by the defendant, also reports for January, 
February, and March[.]" (R 78). Apparently, at the beginning of 
his probation, Dell agreed to file a report each month rather than 
just for the month of May. 
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to the probation department. See (R 78, 80). Their agreement is 
analogous to a debtor/creditor agreement which requires the debtor 
to submit payments by the 5th of each month or the creditor will 
enforce the obligations of the agreement. However, regardless of 
what the contract may state, if the creditor repeatedly accepts the 
debtor's untimely payments, a court will find that the creditor has 
waived its right to enforce the strict terms of their agreement. 
See, e.g., Kummli v. Myers, 400 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
In Kummli, three promissory notes "provided[, inter alia,] 
that if the makers were in default with respect to the payment of 
the installments as they became due and payable, the unpaid balance 
of the principal and accrued interest were to become due and payable 
at once at the option of the noteholders . . . " Id. at 775. The 
debtors made payments: 
irregularly and without protest [by the creditors] as 
to the delay. . . . At no time prior to [the demand 
for payment] had there been a suggestion that failure 
on the part of the [debtors] to make payment on the 
first of each month would result in a demand for 
accelerated payment of the entire balance of principal 
and interest. From the outset, in short, the record 
indicates a waiver of strict compliance with the terms 
of the respective [promissory] notes. 
. . . 
[B]y operation of equity the course of conduct of 
the parties may bring about a modification of their 
strict legal rights and obligations to the point that 
the creditor could be said to have created a waiver of 
its right to accelerate "without at least implicitly 
giving prior notice of its intention to do so should 
default again occur." 
Kummli, 400 F.2d at 776-77 (citations omitted); accord Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 70A-2-208, -209 (1980) 
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Similarly, the "debtor" here, Dell Archuleta, was also 
required to satisfy his monthly requirement pursuant to the strict 
terms of his agreement. Yet because AP&P, like the creditor in 
Kummli, repeatedly accepted the irregular and untimely monthly 
performances, AP&P effectively waived its right to enforce the terms 
of the agreement.3 No prior notice of AP&P's changed intention was 
given to Archuleta. 
When Dell Archuleta met with his first probation officer, 
Kevin Nitzel, Nitzel recorded that he had "signed the defendant up 
on probation, all conditions explained, defendant was referred for 
[an] evaluation, and needs a job ASAP." (T 33-34) (emphasis 
added). Following their discussion, however, Archuleta forgot to 
fill out the monthly report. (T 20, 23). Nitzel would call 
Archuleta, reminding him of the monthly requirement. (T 20). 
Archuleta responded immediately, completing the report the same day 
as he was called or shortly thereafter. (T 20). Kevin Nitzel 
considered the "violation" harmless, having never instituted an 
Order to Show Cause hearing for the revocation of Archuleta's 
probation. 
3
 AP&P's acceptance of, and acquiescence to, the 
performance of Dell Archuleta should extend to all of the alleged 
violations stated in the "Affidavit in Support of the Order to Show 
Cause." (R 80-81). For example, Archuleta's situation at the time 
of Karl Bartell's supervision was almost identical in every respect 
to his situation at the time of Kevin Nitzel's and Harvey Van 
Katwyk's supervision. Just as Nitzel and Van Katwyk did not seek 
revocation proceedings for Archuleta's alleged noncompliance, so too 
should Bartell be estopped, absent appropriate notice, from revoking 
his probation for the very same conduct when it had been previously 
allowed by the other two officers. See infra note 4 and 
accompanying text. 
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The second probation officer, Harvey Van Katwyk, allowed a 
course of performance similar to that permitted by Nitzel. If Dell 
Archuleta forgot the monthly report, Van Katwyk would request 
compliance, and Dell would respond immediately. (T 20): 
Q [By defense counsel]: Dell, were there any months 
that you didn't report to somebody at the probation 
department? 
A [By Dell Archuleta]: Just the last month. But 
there [were] times where I would forget. I know that 
sounds terrible. I would forget. Like Kevin would 
call me, or Harvey would call me, and [tell me], Dell, 
you forgot again. Right away, I knew what they were 
talking about. I would go in either that day or the 
following day and take care of it. 
(T 2 0). Once, when Archuleta forgot to fill out the monthly report 
during his course of dealing with Van Katwyk, Harvey "came to 
[Archuleta's] house and asked how I was doing. He said I forgot to 
fill out the report. So I went in the next day." (T 14). Despite 
Archuleta's noncompliance with the terms of his agreement, Van 
Katwyk never commenced probation revocation proceedings against 
him. Van Katwyk and Kevin Nitzel both gave Archuleta "leeway" in 
fulfilling the conditions of his probation agreement. 
The third probation officer, Karl Bartell, also acted in a 
manner resembling the two preceding officers. In April, 1990, 
Bartell left a message at the Archuleta residence for him to call 
AP&P. (T 9). Archuleta responded, reporting to the officer the 
very next day. (T 10). As he had done with his other probation 
officers, Archuleta discussed his probation with Bartell, 
confirming "what he [Archuleta] was supposed to do, [and] how he 
was supposed to conduct himself on probation." (T 6-7). Archuleta 
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"agreed to start making some of his restitution payments and his 
back child support payments, and he would get out and get a job, and 
that he would come in monthly and fill out his reports, and start 
doing what his probation agreement stated to." (T 7-8). In other 
words, Dell Achuleta made the same agreements that he had made with 
the other probation officers. Compare (T 6-7) with (T 33-34). 
Karl Bartell did not notify Archuleta of his intention to 
revoke probation for noncompliance through means any different than 
the other probation officers. Bartell did review the conditions of 
probation and discuss "what [Archuleta] was suppose to do," but 
their discussion was consistent with Archuleta's prior discussions 
with Kevin Nitzel and Harvey Van Katwyk.4 Just as the district 
court in Kummli had "failed to take [into] account . . . the 
equities" of the situation, Kummli v. Myers, 400 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968), the district court here also failed to recognize 
4
 Karl Bartell was an inexperienced probation officer who 
had not supervised any probationers prior to March, 1990, the time 
at which he was assigned to Dell Archuleta's case. (T 4, 9). While 
Bartell may have had with good intentions, he overreacted to the 
perceived violations. Archuleta was in an almost identical 
situation in regards to his employment, his monthly reports, and his 
finances throughout the period of his probation. His alleged 
noncompliance with the first two officers mirrored his alleged 
noncompliance with Karl Bartell. Officers Nitzel and Van Katwyk 
recognized that Archuleta, a first time offender of a nonviolent 
crime with many personal problems and no marketable skills, 
(T 35-38), was an individual doing the best he could under the 
circumstances. Neither officer ever suggested that revocation 
proceedings were appropriate. Only officer Bartell, perhaps in an 
overzealous attempt to establish a "hard-nosed" reputation, 
considered Dell Archuleta's conduct so egregious that it warranted a 
"commit[ment] to the Utah State Prison for the term prescribed by 
law." (R 79). 
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that a waiver or modification of the strict terms of the agreement 
resulted from AP&P's continued acquiescence to Archuleta's prior 
course of performance. The principles of Kummliy a civil case, are 
even more compelling here because the protections afforded Dell 
Archuleta, a probationer, should be greater than the "equities" 
permitted a debtor of a loan or a seller of goods. Cf. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 70A-2-208, -209 (1980) (statutory provisions dealing with 
the course of performance and modifications, rescissions, and 
waivers between buyers and sellers of goods). 
B. APPELLANT'S PROBATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REVOKED 
FOR HIS ALLEGED FAILURE TO MAINTAIN LAWFUL EMPLOYMENT 
In its order, the court also found that Dell Archuleta had 
"failed to maintain verifiable, lawful employment and/or 
education . . . " (R 95). In addition, the court noted: 
This Court will take judicial notice that from South 
Temple to 5300 South on State Street, on any given 
day, there are probably 15 or 20 help wanted signs 
posted in living color in the windows of business 
establishments. Employment in this community can be 
had, if a person is serious about being employed. 
Compensation may not be more than minimum wage. 
Nevertheless, it is there for a person serious about 
being employed. 
(T 31). While some of the court7s statements may have been correct, 
its finding that Dell Archuleta had not maintained lawful employment 
was in error. 
Dell Archuleta obtained full-time employment at the Red 
Lion Hotel from "around Thanksgiving [1989]" until "around February 
[1990.]" (T 14-15). After his employer accused him of stealing 
i 
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someone's eyeglasses, Archuleta quit the job. (T 15). Thereafter, 
though, Dell obtained temporary and part-time employment through Job 
Service. (T 18). His repeated efforts at obtaining employment 
rewarded him with a "preferred customer in need of work11 type of 
status at Job Service: "[T]he people [at Job Service] knew me 
[Archuleta], so sometimes, they would call me over there and say, We 
have a job. Do you want to go? Yeah, I would go." (T 18). Dell 
Archuleta also worked part-time for his mother, Lillian, a woman who 
had attempted to renew their relationship after abandoning Dell when 
he was a baby. (T 18, 22). He worked for her at least "once a 
week." (T 18). 
When Archuleta was not employed or ill, he was actively 
searching for work. He filed applications at various establishments 
including Mulboon's; Village Inn; Coachman's; Doubletree; 
Marriott's; Coyote Bill's; and Su Casa. (T 16). Dell Archuleta's 
testimony was not rebutted or even questioned by the State.5 
Archuleta's undisputed testimony reflects that he was in fact 
"serious about being employed." He may not have looked on State 
Street, but he did find employment elsewhere. His candor in 
admitting his felony conviction on the job applications may 
5
 The State did not dispute Dell Archuleta's testimony 
concerning his employment. Rather, they attempted to use his 
employment against him by arguing that he should have had money to 
pay the court ordered amounts. But see infra, Point I.e. 
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have limited his marketability,6 (T 15), even for minimum wage 
employment, but his bona fide efforts to find a job and his actual 
periods of full-time, part-time, and temporary employment should not 
have been ignored by the court. 
C. APPELLANT'S PROBATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
REVOKED FOR HIS FINANCIAL NONCOMPLIANCE 
BECAUSE HE WAS UNABLE TO PAY THE COURT 
ORDERED AMOUNTS 
The remaining "justifications" given by the court for its 
decision to revoke probation concerned the defendant's failure to 
pay $100.00 per month towards his fine and $300.00 per month in 
child support payments. (R 95-96). The basis for the court's 
decision may be gleaned from the rhetorical questions the court 
asked itself at the end of the order to show cause hearing: 
The Court has listened to all the testimony, 
reviewed the evidence. The Court has a number of 
questions that have been asked silently and 
rhetorically to the Court. 
6
 Most of the help wanted signs the court referred to on 
State Street probably encompassed fast food restaurants in need of 
cashiers or establishments giving employees easy access to the cash 
of incoming customers. (T 31). Dell Archuleta was convicted of 
Theft, a second degree felony, and Theft by Deception, a class B 
misdemeanor. (R 25, 26). Besides the usual negative stigma 
confronting convicted felons, the nature of Dell Archuleta's 
convictions would make even the most forgiving owner hesitant about 
employing Mr. Archuleta. 
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If the defendant in fact was gainfully employed 
for any period of time during his probation agreement, 
why was not a token payment made, either in the form 
of restitution, the fine or child support? A token 
payment, $5, $10, $20. Any amount of money to 
persuade the Court that the defendant was mindful of 
that responsibility, and serious about discharging it. 
(T 29, 30). The court erred in at least two material respects. 
First, the court never informed Dell Archuleta that token payments 
would satisfy the conditions of his probation. Second, Archuleta 
did in fact make token payments toward his financial obligations. 
The court never communicated its willingness to accept 
partial payments as a basis for satisfying Archuleta's probation. 
In State v. Hodges, 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1990), this 
Court followed: 
the requirement that a probationer be clearly and 
accurately apprised of the expectations for remaining 
on probation. See State v. Penney, 776 P.2d 91, 93 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (probation sentences must be 
rendered with clarity and accuracy in order to avoid 
the possibility of confusion and injustice); Rich v. 
State, 640 P.2d 159, 162 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) 
(probation conditions must be sufficiently precise and 
unambiguous to inform probationer of conduct essential 
to retain liberty). 
Hodges, 142 Utah Adv. Rep. at 44. When the court sentenced 
Archuleta and imposed his probation, it said nothing about token 
amounts. Instead, the court stressed complete payments: "The Court 
expects that child support and arrearages to be paid in full, your 
current child support to be maintained, the fine to be paid, and the 
restitution to be paid." (R 111) (Transcript of October 6, 1989 
sentencing proceeding when probation was originally imposed at 
page 7) (emphasis added). Since the court did not then clearly 
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convey the boundaries of permissible conforming conduct to 
Mr. Archuleta, it cannot now use or consider the alleged absence of 
the token payments against him by stating, in essence, that partial 
payments would have been sufficient. 
More importantly, however, was the court's failure to 
recognize that Dell Archuleta did in fact make payments towards the 
court ordered amounts. Dell's ex-wife, Mercy, required monetary 
payments before she allowed him to see their daughter: 
Q [By defense counsel]: Was there any expense 
involved in your visits with your daughter? 
A [Dell Archuleta]: I would give Mercy money, 
sometimes, if I could see her, like if she would spend 
the night or something, food. I can't afford to go 
out to restaurants. 
. . . 
Mercy was letting me see Veronica. I thought 
that's good. She told me to pay $20 a month, at least. 
. . • 
It is all I can do, give Mercy money to see 
Veronica. Sometimes she charges me a lot of money to 
see her. Lately, she has been letting me see her. 
(T 19, 20, 42). The court, however, found the defendant 
irresponsible and categorized his contentions as "a bunch of 
baloney." (T 42). Yet there was nothing in the record which 
rebutted Archuleta's testimony that he gave Mercy money to see 
Veronica. (T 19, 20, 42). Though Archuleta may have believed them 
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to be visitation payments,7 the money went towards his court ordered 
obligations and should have been properly classified as the 
functional equivalent of child support payments. 
His direct payments to Mercy were no different than 
indirect payments submitted to the Division of Recovery Services 
who, in turn, would have paid Mercy on Archuleta's behalf. In fact 
if Mercy had said, "Dell, before you can see Veronica you must first 
pay some of your child support obligations," the end result would 
have been the same. Mislabeling aside, Archuleta's "visitation" 
payments constituted "child support" payments. 
Admittedly, Dell Archuleta did not pay the entire amount 
due but if the court had desired proof of only a "token payment 
. . . to persuade the Court that the defendant was mindful of [his 
financial responsibilities]," Archuleta's payments reflected the 
appropriate state of mind. Indeed, considering Dell Archuleta's 
financial situation, his "token payments" were quite substantial 
given the fact that the visitation payments actually drew from his 
necessary living expenses. 
7 Because Dell Archuleta did not make the payments through 
the Division of Recovery Services, he may not have considered the 
"visitation" or extortion type payments as child support payments. 
Thus, when asked if he had paid "a penny" towards the court ordered 
payments, Archuleta said, "No." (T 21, 24). However, as discussed 
above in the text accompanying this footnote, Dell's visitation 
payments were the equivalent of child support payments. 
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Dell#s indebtedness included expenses for his rent; a 
hospital bill; the phone bill; the electricity; gas; and food. 
(T 18-19). His lack of education and the continuing effects of a 
"car accident" injury qualified him for nothing more than minimum 
wage employment. (T 15). Archuleta's monthly salary, even when he 
was fully employed, often could not cover his entire rent. (T 21). 
After taxes, his wages would never be enough to satisfy, in full, 
all of his monthly financial obligations. (T 21). Dell could not 
even afford dental treatment for his abscessed tooth. (T 17). He 
pulled the tooth out himself, (T 17), thereby saving some money for 
the visitation payments which could have otherwise gone towards the 
needed dental treatment. 
While Dell could have refused to pay his bills, he chose 
instead to arrange a partial payment schedule with the hospital, the 
utility company, and the gas company. (T 20, 21). Even the "people 
at Recovery Services" understood his financial predicament and 
permitted bit payments to accommodate his situation. (T 20). 
I . . . The Division of Recovery Services, though empowered with 
great statutory authority "to collect . . . criminal assessments, 
fines, [or] fees . . . owed to the state[,]" Utah Code Ann. 
§ 62A-11-104(6) (1990), did nothing during the entire period of 
probation to collect the outstanding amounts still due. There were 
no garnishment proceedings, no income withholding orders, and no 
lien actions instituted against Archuleta. Dell did not ignore the 
Division; rather Archuleta maintained a proper relationship with 
them. He did what he could under the circumstances: 
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I [Dell Archuleta] would have kind of a good 
relationship with people at Recovery Services, They 
know me fairly well. I have been going to see them 
for a while now. I told them that I hadn't been 
working. When I was working, I would tell them. They 
would say, Just pay her this much. When I wasn't 
working, I would tell them, I am not working right now. 
(T 20). Dell's mistake, if any, was making direct payments to his 
ex-wife, Mercy, rather than paying the Division gf Recovery 
Services. However, his direct approach still provided Mercy with 
child support payments. 
Dell took money from his salary in order to see his 
daughter. He actually placed himself further into indebtedness by 
using some of his income, all of which were needed for his living 
expenses and the collecting agencies, to pay his ex-wife for the 
privilege of seeing Veronica. 
In short, Dell Archuleta did not "act with a bad purpose" 
by failing to make the court ordered payments. He was financially 
unable to comply. Dell did make payments to Mercy and given his 
indebtedness, he made substantial inroads towards his obligations. 
Even under the most favorable circumstances, however, Archuleta 
could not have paid the amounts ordered in full. But the trial 
court cannot revoke his probation because of his indigent status. 
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). Dell Archuleta's 
noncompliance with probation must be "willful." State v. Hodges, 
142 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 43 (Utah App. 1990). Dell did not 
"stubbornly, obstinately, [or] perversely" refuse to comply, nor did 
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he have an abundance of money which he simply withheld from Mercy or 
the court. The court erred in its decision to revoke Dell 
Archuleta's probation for financial noncompliance. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's decision to revoke his probation. 
SUBMITTED this jfi day of October, 1990. 
j)\bd C , . fcmgj? 
LISA J . JREMAL 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t 
RONISTFUJINO ONl 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
IJ RON S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
I 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this \o day of October, 1990. 
RON iS. FUJ3JNO « 
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DELIVERED by 
this day of October, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM A 
62A-11-104. Duties of office. 
The office has the following duties: 
(1) to collect child support from an obligor if the department has pro-
vided public assistance, or if the department has contracted to collect 
support; 
(2) to carry at the obligations of the department contained in this 
chapter, in Chapters 45 and 45a of Title 78, and in Chapter 31, Title 77, 
for the purpose of collecting child support; 
(3) to recover public assistance provided to persons for which they were 
ineligible; 
(4) to collect money due the department which could act to offset expen-
ditures by the state; 
(5) to cooperate with the federal government in programs designed to 
recover health and social service funds; 
(6) to collect civil or criminal assessments, fines, fees, amounts 
awarded as restitution, and reimbursable expenses owed to the state or 
any of its political subdivisions, if the office has contracted to provide 
collection services; 
(7) to implement income withholding for collection of child support in 
accordance with Part 4 of this chapter; and 
(8) to finance any costs incurred from collections. 
70A-2-208. Course of performance or practical construction. 
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for perfor-
mance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the perfor-
mance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course 
of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall 
be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement. 
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any such course of perfor-
mance, as well as any course of dealing and usage of trade, shall 
be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other; 
but when such construction is unreasonable, express terms shall 
control course of performance and course of performance shall con-
trol both course of dealing and usage of trade (section 70a-l-2Q5). 
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next section on modification and 
waiver, such course of performance shall be relevant to show a 
waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with such course 
of performance. 
70A-2-209. Modification, rescission and waiver. 
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this chapter needs no 
consideration to be binding. 
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission 
except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or 
rescinded, but except as between merchants such a requirement on 
a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the 
other party. 
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this chapter 
(section 70A-2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is 
within its provisions. 
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy 
the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver. 
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of 
the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification 
received by the other party that strict performance will be required 
of any term waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view 
Readjustment of a material change of position in reliance on the 
waiver. 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
10 ' \Cl ~&\ "O-Cn j U D G M E N T f SENTENCE 
Plaintiff.
 N (COMMITMENT) 
vs. f Case No. 
Defendant. 
)£2&U 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly'is D granted D denied. There being no tegal or other reason whysentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant haying been convicted b^B^uury; D the c.otirt; a plea of guilty; 
D pfea of no contest; of the offense of *~~t l)fT'Tm ; a felony 
of the ^ degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready jor sentence and 
represented by ^ and the State being represented by is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
D^of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; _ & _ &}&tj€/£-
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ Arj QQU'; QQ 
island ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ *77« to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
5r Defendant is granted a stay of the above (pr ison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of. /ft MfKThS ., pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded intothecustody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. ^ -m]:% v '«, 
D Commitment shall issue 
DATED this Jy2L_ day of 
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Probation and Parole; B"at a rate of if\ ftUI ba IA~J" RO ; or D at a rate to be determined by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete any — program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
D Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or • vocational training D as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with 
D Participate in and complete any training D as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; or D with 
D Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
D Submit to drug testing. 
D Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
• Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
D Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
D Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
D Take antabuse D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
BTObtain and maintain full-time employment. Q-O HBUAJO A lO&ck** 
D Maintain full-time employment. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling. 
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with . D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution in lieu of days in jail. 
D^Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on — _ — for a review of this sentence.
 AT) 
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ADDENDUM C 
Thiro jud^.ciat Dislnct 
MAY 1 8 1990 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS 
ARCHULETA, Dell D. 
Defendant 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Court Case No: 891901028 
Judge: Pat Brian 
Def. At ty . : Lisa Remal 
t^ 
) 
) : ss 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Karl B a r t e l l , being duly sworn upon an oath deposes 
and says that : He i s a Probation Officer for the Utah State Department of 
Correct ions; that on the 18th dav of September, 1989, the above-named 
defendant was adjudged g u i l t y of the crime of Theft, a Second Degree 
Felony in the above-ent i t led Court and on the 6th day of October, 1989, 
was sentenced to serve a term of 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison; that 
the execution of the imposed sentence was stayed and the defendant was 
placed on probation under the supervision of the Department of 
Corrections; that the above-ent i t led defendant did v io la t e the terms and 
condit ions of the defendant's probation as fo l lows , to -wi t : 
vft 
The defendant has v io la ted his probation agreement byjw-oTaTting 
condit ion number 1; in that he has not submitted his^monthly report 
May by the 5th of the month as agreed to by the defenSairtr 
^-v .*"^  ^ /7r\ 
ARCHULETA, Dell D. 
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2. The defendant has v i o l a t e d h i s p roba t ion agreement by v i o l a t i n g 
c o n d i t i o n number 3; in t h a t he changed or e s t a b l i s h e d anotherV^es idence^ 
wi thout n o t i f y i n g or knowledge of h i s p roba t ion agen t . That the^Tnrme—-
v i s i t of the l a s t known a d d r e s s . A Mr. Boyd Byrner s t a ted the defendan 
i s l i v i n g with h i s s i s t e r a t another a d d r e s s ; 
The defendant has v io l a t ed h is p roba t ion agreement by v i o l a t i n g 
cond i t i on number 10>-4ir-tira-t-^^ defendant f a i l e d to maintain 
v e r i f i a b l e , lawfu<^employmenjt^hd/or educa t ion ; 
/4y> The defendant has v i o l a t e d h i s proba t ion agreement by v i o l a t i n g 
^ ^ / c o n d i t i o n number 11B; in t h a t the defendant has f a i l ed to pay the. 
hy* minimum amount set bv the Court of $100.00 per month towards h i$ fine 
/ r e q u i r e d by the Court ; and, 
C ^ / The defendant has v i o l a t e d h is probat ion agreement by v i o l a t i n g 
c^ji_di-t-i^n-^tmb^x_nG; in t ha t the defendant has f a i l ed to make anvCchil 
suppor t payments J ^ n d any payments toward the ch i ld support a r r e a r s ; 
/ "^irft~ira~s'~to"1>e-at a r a t e of 3225.00 per month with t o t a l payments bein 
$300.00 per month. ¥/ 
WHEREFORE, vour a f f i a n t prays t ha t an Order of the Court i ssue 
d i r e c t i n g and r e q u i r i n g the above-named defendant to be and appear before 
s a i d Court to show cause , if any, he h a s , why the aforesa id period of 
p roba t ion should not be revoked, and why said defendant should not be 
f o r t h w i t h committed to the Utah S t a t e P r i s o n . 
KARL/fiARTELL PROBATION OFFICER 
Subscr ibed and sworn to before me t h i s 
R e s r a t n p : S a l t Lake C i ty , Utah 
Commission e x p i r e s : r$-/*/"?V 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
GLYNN KIMBALL 
275 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
My Commission Expires-
February M. 1994 
STATE OF UTAH 
OOQO£ 
ADDENDUM D 
Third Judicial District 
LISA J. REMAL, (#2722) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
DELL D. ARCHULETTA, : Case No. 891901028FS 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN 
Defendant. : 
After having heard the testimony of the witnesses presented 
by the State and by the defendant, and having heard the arguments of 
counsel, 
The Court finds that the defendnat has violated his 
probation as follows: 
1. The defendant failed to report to Adult Probation and 
Parole in May, 1990, as alleged in allegation No. 1 of the Order to 
Show Cause. 
2. The defendant failed to maintain verifiable, lawful 
employment and/or education, as alleged in allegation No. 3 of the 
Order to Show Cause. 
3. The defendant failed to pay $100 per month towards his 
fine, as alleged in allegation No. 4 of the Order to Show Cause. 
JUL 6 1S90 
[COUNTY 
Deputy ( «£^mj^ 
OQOQ2 
4. The defendant failed to pay a total of $300 per month 
towards his child support obligation, as alleged in allegation No. 5 
of the Order to Show Cause. 
Based upon those findings, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's probation be 
revoked and reinstated on probation for eighteen (18) months after 
his release from jail upon the following conditions: 
1. That all conditions of probation previously imposed be 
in effect. 
2. That he serve six months in jail with credit for time 
served. 
3. That within fifteen calendar days from his release from 
jail/ he be employed sixty hours per week, and that he provide 
written verification of the same. 
4. That he be enrolled in vocational training as soon as 
possible after his release from jail, but no later than ninety days 
from that release; further that any costs he pays towards said 
vocational training can be deducted from the fine previously 
imposed. 
DATED this 6 day of July, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE PAT 
Third District Court 
Appr/vecLa/s to form: 
IDAS 
rt^jCounty Attorney 
OOOO' 
